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Scalar Implicatures
Standard examples of scalar implicatures:
(1) The Philharmonic played many of Beethoven’s
symphonies.
 The Philharmonic didn’t play all nine.
(2) I saw Elvis or Bobby Fischer at the airport.
 I didn’t see both Elvis and Fischer.
(for example Levinson 1983)Epistemic Step
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The Epistemic Step
(3) Maxim of Quantity: Make the most informative
statement that you know to be true.
(4) The Philharmonic played many of Beethoven’s
symphonies.
(5) Primary Implicature: The speaker is not sure
that the Philharmonic played all of Beethoven’s
symphonies.
(6) Secondary Implicature: The speaker is sure
that the Philharmonic did not play all of
Beethoven’s symphonies.
Grice’s maxim only yields primary implicatures.
Secondary implicatures require an epistemic step
(Terminology from Sauerland 2004).Epistemic Step
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Disjunction
(7) I saw Elvis or Bobby Fischer at the airport.
The ‘generalized conventional implicatures of
disjunction’ (Gazdar, 1979) really follow from the
primary implicatures (Sauerland, 2004):
(8) a. The speaker is not sure that he saw Elvis
at the airport.
b. The speaker is not sure that he saw
Fischer at the airport.
From (7) and (8), the ‘conventional implicatures’ follow:
(9) a. The speaker thinks it’s possible he saw
Fischer at the airport.
b. The speaker thinks it’s possible he saw
Elvis at the airport.Epistemic Step
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Absence of the Epistemic Step
The secondary implicatures in (10) are blocked
because they contradict the primary ones in (11).
(10) Potential secondary implicatures:
a. The speaker is sure that he did not see
Elvis at the airport.
b. The speaker is sure that he did not see
Fischer at the airport.
(11) Contradicting primary implicatures:
a. The speaker thinks it’s possible he saw
Fischer at the airport.
b. The speaker thinks it’s possible he saw
Elvis at the airport.
Summary: In disjunction, primary implicatures occur
independently of secondary ones.Epistemic Step
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Survival under Cancellation
After cancellation of secondary implicatures, primary
implicatures survive.
(12) The Philharmonic played many of Beethoven’s
symphonies, and possibly all of them.
(13) The speaker isn’t certain they played all nine.
(14) I saw Elvis or Bobby Fischer at the airport, and
possibly both of them.
(15) The speaker isn’t certain that he saw both Elvis
and Fischer.Epistemic Step
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Survival at least/more than
Primary implicatures also remain when at least or
more than block a secondary implicature.
(16) a. Terry had at least three beers.
b. Terry had more than two beers.
(17) a. Primary implicature:
The speaker is not certain that Terry had
four beers.
b. No secondary implicature:
∗The speaker is certain that Terry did not
have four beers.Epistemic Step
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Non-cancellability
Primary implicatures cannot be cancelled (Sauerland
2005, and independently R. v. Rooy, K. Schulz and B.
Spector, p.c.):
(18) #The Philharmonic played many of Beethoven’s
symphonies, and certainly all of them.
(19) #I saw Elvis or Bobby Fischer at the airport, and
certainly both of them.Epistemic Step
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In Fact
In fact involves a correction accompanied by a shift of
relevance (van Rooy, p.c.):
(20) A: Who has seen Elvis or Fischer?
B: I saw Elvis or Fischer at the airport. (No:)
In fact, I saw both.
(21) A: Why are you so excited?
B: #I saw Elvis or Fischer at the airport. In
fact, I saw both.
Summary: Only secondary implicatures can be
cancelled.Epistemic Step
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Implicated Presuppositions
Hawkins (1981) attributes the oddness of (22a) to a
anti-uniqueness implicature.
(22) a. #The journalist interviewed a father of the
victim.
b. The journalist interviewed the father of the
victim.
Heim (1991): Since presuppositions aren’t informative,
we need a new maxim, namely (24).
(23) Maxim of Quantity: Make the most informative
statement that you know to be true.
(24) Maximize Presupposition: Make the statement
with the strongest presupposition that you
know to be satisﬁed.Epistemic Step
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Epistemic Status of Anti-Uniqueness
The epistemic step doesn’t apply in (25):
(25) Kai caught a 3 ft. long catﬁsh. (Heim, 1991)
(26) primary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is not certain that there’s only one
3 ft. long ﬁsh.
(27) no secondary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is certain that there’s another 3 ft.
long ﬁsh.Epistemic Step
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Non-Factivity of believe
Believe vs. know gives rise to non-factivity:
(28) Scientists believe that neutrinos have mass.
Again, the epistemic step doesn’t seem to apply:
(29) primary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is not certain that neutrinos have
mass.
(30) no secondary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is certain that neutrinos have no
mass.Epistemic Step
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Non-Pastness of the Present
Sauerland (2002): Non-pastness of the present is an
implicated presupposition.
(31) Lina is chasing a butterﬂy.
(32) primary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is not certain that Lina’s butterﬂy
chasing is over.
For (31), the strong presupposition (33) seems
appropriate.
(33) secondary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is certain that Lina’s butterﬂy
chasing is not over.Epistemic Step
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Non-singularity of the Plural
Sauerland (2003): The non-singularity of the plural is
an implicated presupposition.
(34) John is coming with his children.
(35) primary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is not sure that John has just one
child.
(36) secondary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is sure that John has more than
one child.
Summary: The epistemic step doesn’t apply to some
implicated presuppositions.Epistemic Step
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Secondary Implicatures can be Embedded
(37) When John OR Mary worked, the result was
good, but when John and Mary worked, the
result was a mess.
The exclusivity implicature of or must be added to the
antecendent of the conditional.
(38) When exactly one of John and Mary worked,
the result was good.Epistemic Step
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Primary Implicatures Cannot be Embedded
If primary implicatures could be embedded, (39)
should be congruent.
(39) #When John OR Mary worked, the result was
good, but when John worked, the result was a
mess.
With an embedded primary implicatures, the ﬁrst
conjunct would be (40):
(40) When the speakers knows that one of John
and Mary worked, but doesn’t know which one,
the result was good.Epistemic Step
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Verba dicendi
Verba dicendi seem to allow embedding of primary
implicatures:
(41) When the log says that John or Mary worked,
the result was good, but when it says that John
worked, the result was a mess.
I assume these are partial quotations:
(42) When the log says that “John or Mary” worked,
the result was good, but when it says that
“John” worked, the result was a mess.Epistemic Step
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Section Summary
Primary implicatures are well behaved Gricean
phenomena.
In particular, they seem to be:
 non-cancellable
 unembeddableEpistemic Step
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Primary vs. Secondary Implicatures
In most examples, secondary implicatures are salient:
(43) The Philharmonic played many of Beethoven’s
symphonies.
 I’m not sure that the Philharmonic didn’t play
all nine.
 I sure that the Philharmonic didn’t play all
nine.
(44) I saw Elvis or Bobby Fischer at the airport.
 I’m not sure that I saw both Elvis and
Fischer.
 I’m sure that I didn’t saw both Elvis and
Fischer.
How are secondary implicatures derived? How are
primary and secondary ones related?Epistemic Step
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Account 1: Epistemic Strengthening
Assumption of Experthood (Sauerland, 2004; van
Rooij and Schulz, 2004) (cf. Soames 1982; Horn 1989;
Spector 2003):
(45) Assume that the speaker is certain that p holds
or is certain that ¬p holds in so far as
consistent with the the assertion and primary
implicatures.
For example (46a) and (46b) entail (46c):
(46) a. I’m not sure that the Philharmonic didn’t
play all nine.
b. Either I’m sure they played all nine or I’m
sure they didn’t.
c. → I’m sure they didn’t play all nine.Epistemic Step
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Account 2: Independent Generation
Added or silent material, in particular silent only (Fox,
2003) (possibly related accounts of Carston 1988;
Recanati 2003):
(47) The Philharmonic only played many of
Beethoven’s symphonies.
Silent only can optionally occur.
(48) a. The P. only played manyF of B’s
symphonies.
b. The P. played manyF of B’s symphonies.
Representation is preferred because it answers (49)
completely:
(49) How many of B’s symphonies did the P. play?Epistemic Step
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Proposal Today
Both account 1 and account 2 are needed.
In particular:
 Epistemic strengthening is restricted to the
speakers personal experience, where the
experthood assumption is justiﬁed.
 Silent only derives embedded implicatures.Epistemic Step
U. Sauerland
Overview
Primary
Disjunction
Cancellability
Presuppositions
Embedding
Secondary
Proposal
Derive Disjunction
Derive Cancel.
Derive Presupp.
Derive Embed.
Notes on Only
Conclusion
References
Disjunction
(50) I saw Elvis or Bobby Fischer at the airport.
Two derivations possible:
(51) Assume: Either I am sure that I saw Elvis and
Bobby Fischer, or I am sure that I didn’t see
Elvis and Bobby Fischer.
(52) I only saw Elvis orF Bobby Fischer at the
airport.
Since silent only associates with or, (52) doesn’t
contradict the primary implicatures.Epistemic Step
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Cancellability
Scalar sentences are structurally ambiguous. For
example, (51) allows the two structures (53a) and
(53b):
(53) a. I saw only Elvis orF Fischer.
b. I saw Elvis or Fischer.
‘Cancellation’ disambiguates towards (53b):
(54) I saw Elvis or Fischer, and possibly both.
The primary implicatures are still present, but
epistemic strengthening doesn’t apply because the
experthood assumption is cancelled.Epistemic Step
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Presuppositions
Recall that some implicated presuppositions do not
give rise to secondary implicatures.
(55) Kai caught a 3 ft. long catﬁsh.
(56) no secondary implicated presupposition:
The speaker is certain that there’s another 3 ft.
long ﬁsh.
 Silent only does not compare alternatives that
only differ by their presuppositions.
 The epistemic step is restricted.Epistemic Step
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Only and Presuppositions
A hypothetical presupposition-sensitive lexical entry for
only (cf. von Fintel 1999):
(57) ‘only P’ presupposes P, and is true if and only
if:
All alternatives P  to P are either false or cause
a presupposition violation.
At ﬁrst it seems, only can compare presuppositions:
(58) Kai only caught ONE 3 ft. long catﬁsh, not the
3 ft. long catﬁsh.
But, the comparison can be between one vs. two.Epistemic Step
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Only and Speaker Oriented
Presuppositions
(59) He only went out with the BAStard X, (not the
ASShole X.)
Relevant speaker oriented presuppositions:
(60) a. ‘The bastard X’ denotes John, and
presupposes that the speaker believes
that John is a bastard.
b. ‘The asshole X’ denotes John, and
presupposes that the speaker believes
that John is a bastard.
Predicted, but unavailable meaning:
(61) a. Presupposition: He went out with X.
b. The speaker believes that John is bastard,
but not that he is an asshole.Epistemic Step
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Non-Factivity
(62) He only BELIEVES that he solved the problem.
Relevant alternative:
(63) He knows that he solved the problem.
Predicted, but unavailable meaning:
(64) He believes that he solved the problem, but
didn’t actually.
Hence: Only does not maximize presuppositions.Epistemic Step
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Epistemic Strengthening
Silent only can associate with three, but not with a.
(65) a. Kai caught a 3 ft. long catﬁsh.
b. Kai caught only a THREEF ft. long catﬁsh.
Prediction: Any secondary implicated presupposition
must be due to epistemic strengthening:
(66) a. #Kai met a child of mine.
b. Kai caught a 3 ft. long catﬁsh.
(67) Presupposition: The speaker is sure that he
has more than one child.Epistemic Step
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Further Support: Epistemic Strengthening
Epistemic strengthening doesn’t apply to implicated
presuppositions:
(68) a. Scientists believe that neutrinos have
mass.
b. The speaker is not sure that neutrinos
have mass.
Epistemic strengthening does apply:
(69) a. Lina is chasing a butterﬂy.
b. The speaker is sure that the chase has not
yet ended.
(70) a. John is coming with his children.
b. The speaker is sure that John doesn’t
have one child.Epistemic Step
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Embedding
Embedded implicatures must be due to silent only.
Therefore, they must be secondary.
(71) When John OR Mary worked, the result was
good, but when John worked, the result was a
mess.
(72) When only John OR Mary worked, the result
was good.
Since (72) entails (73), (71) is incongruent.
(73) When John worked, the result was a mess.Epistemic Step
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Section Summary
There are two routes to a secondary implicatures:
 Epistemic strengthening if the speaker is an
expert
 Independent generation with silent only
Both are restricted in some way:
 Epistemic strengthening is restricted to the
speakers personal experience, where the
experthood assumption is justiﬁed.
 (Silent) only doesn’t apply to presuppositions.Epistemic Step
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Two Accounts for Only
Linguistic Deﬁnition (cf. Rooth 1985):
(74) only S = all independent alternative sentences
are false.
(75) [[only S]] w= ∀S
  ∈ [[S]] f :[ [ S
 ]] w = 0 ∨ [[S]] → [[S
 ]]
[[S]] f is the set of focus alternatives of S: sentences
derived by replacing the focussed phrases with
alternative phrases.
Modeltheoretic Deﬁnition: ‘Exhaustiﬁcation’
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984); van Rooij and Schulz
(2003, 2004)
(76) only p = The actual situation is a minimal one
for satisfying p.
(77) [[only]] w(Q(et)t)(Pet) = 1 iff.
Q(P)=1 ∧∀ P  : Q(P )=1 → P  ⊆ PEpistemic Step
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An Argument For the Linguistic Only
(78) a. They only played many of Beethoven’s
symphonies.
b. → They didn’t play all nine.
c.  → They didn’t play ﬁve.
(79) [[many]](P)(Q)=1 iff. #{x | P(x) ∧ Q(x)} > 3
(80) a. Only [most]F boys left.
b. → Not all boys left.
c.  → Less than 55% of the boys left.
(81) [[most]](P)(Q)=1 iff.
2#{x | P(x) ∧ Q(x)} > #{x | P(x)}
Linguistic Form matters in determining the alternatives
considered.Epistemic Step
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Summary on only
 This debate is purely semantic.
 Some evidence that linguist form matters.
 Relevance can be added to both accounts (rule
out more relevant alternatives).Epistemic Step
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Conclusion
Implicatures come in two epistemic strenths, and have
three different derivations.
 uncancellable, unembeddable primary
implicatures of the form: the speaker is not certain
that ... and have Gricean account
 secondary implicature derivable in two ways:
 epistemic strengthening of a primary implicature
with experthood assumption
 independent generation with a silent onlyEpistemic Step
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